

# **Determinants of house prices** in central and eastern Europe

Dubravko Mihaljek and Agne Subelyte Bank for International Settlements

OeNB Conference on European Economic Integration

Financial Cycles and the Real Economy: Lessons for CESEE

Session 1: Real Estate Bubbles and the Financial Crisis

Vienna, 18 November 2013

The views expressed in this presentation are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the BIS.



### Outline

- 1. Approaches in the literature
- 2. Understanding a house price "bubble"
- 3. Evidence on the boom-bust cycle
- 4. Determinants of house prices
- 5. Policy implications

**Appendix** 



### 1. Approaches in the literature

How do (empirical) economists think about house prices?

- housing is similar to other assets, we can study housing markets with the aid of asset pricing theories
- there is an "equilibrium" long-term price of housing, it can be uncovered by properly specifying and estimating empirical models of the determinants of house prices
- determinants include demand-side, supply-side and institutional variables

3



### Mainstream approach

### Demand-side determinants ("fundamentals")

- · real disposable income
- real interest rates measure both financing and opportunity costs
- labour market trends (employment growth, unemployment rate)
- demographic factors (population growth, migration trends, size of households)
- credit availability housing finance products, lending practices



### Supply-side factors

- · land for development availability and price
- construction costs construction wages, material costs

#### Institutional factors

- · how developed is the housing finance market
  - types of housing loans
  - secondary mortgage market
  - collateral and bankruptcy legislation
- tax system (mortgage interest deductibility, imputed rents, property and wealth taxes)

5



Challenge: how to combine information on housing market conditions to assess whether current house prices are "right", ie not "out of line" with fundamentals

• Estimate long-run "equilibrium" relationship linking house prices with demand, supply and institutional determinants:

$$P_{it}^* = f(X_{it})$$

Model fluctuations of actual house prices around long-run eq'm

$$\Delta P_{it} = \alpha \Delta P_{i,t-1} + \beta (P^*_{i,t-1} - P_{i,t-1}) + \gamma \Delta P^*_{it}$$

 This is an error-correction equation describing short-run price dynamics

 $\alpha$  = serial correlation term (house prices are persistent),  $\alpha$  > 0  $\beta$  = mean reversion term (rate of adjustment to long-run eq'm), 0 <  $\beta$  < 1  $\gamma$  = contemporaneous adjustment term (how current prices adjust to changes in long-run eq'm prices), 0 <  $\gamma$  < 1

•



- Examine deviations of actual from equilibrium prices P<sub>it</sub>-P<sub>it</sub>
  - (i) component driven by short-run dynamics

$$P_{i,t}^* - [P_{i,t-1} + E_{t-1}(\Delta P_{i,t})]$$

(ii) residual component that cannot be explained by short-run dynamics

$$P_{i,t}^* - P_{i,t} - (P_{i,t-1}^* - (P_{i,t-1} + E_{t-1}(\Delta P_{i,t}))) = E_{t-1}(\Delta P_{i,t}) - (P_{i,t} - P_{i,t-1})$$

Intuition: (i) some deviations of actual from equilibrium prices can be attributed to housing market frictions present in the short term, such as supply bottlenecks, capital inflows, migration shifts, etc.;

(ii) some deviations result from other forces, eg too optimistic or pessimistic expectations

7



- Short-run frictions get smoothed over time, allowing prices to return to their long-term equilibrium ...
- · ... and they can be addressed by different policies
- But some short-run deviations of actual from equilibrium prices cannot be traced back to identifiable demand/supply frictions or changes in housing market institutions
- They may cause large price surges or busts that are unrelated to fundamentals and are difficult to address with conventional policies → house price "bubbles"
- The expectations term  $E_{i,j}(\Delta P_{i,j}) (P_{i,r} P_{i,r,j})$  is an example of how price bubbles can be approximated in empirical work (see eg. A Ciarlone, Banca d'Italia WP 863, 2012)



### 2. Understanding a house price "bubble"

Intuitive definition: state of market in which prices are no longer anchored by fundamentals; prices are expected to rise rapidly on a sustained basis

#### Buyers' reasoning:

- we have to buy now, won't be able to afford a home later
- can buy a more expensive home now than we might afford otherwise: house prices will rise, we'll make capital gains!
- don't have to save as much as otherwise, the increased value of the home is doing the saving for us!
- can borrow more collateral value is rising

9



- · Sellers' / builders' reasoning:
  - we can ask buyers to pay a higher price than we would normally sell for
  - can build more expensive homes than we'd normally consider building – prices will rise!
  - can borrow more to build new homes than otherwise: sales are rising, profit margins are high



- Investors' / speculators' reasoning:
  - we can buy homes cheap and sell them at a higher price
  - can borrow more to finance such investments: value of collateral is rising!
  - know the market well enough to sell homes before prices start to fall
- · Banks' reasoning:
  - we can increase mortgage lending volumes, interest and fee revenue
  - credit risk is low when prices are rising

11




- · Government officials' reasoning:
  - construction and home supply industries are doing well (high output multiplier!)
  - employment is rising
  - banks have brisk business
  - we're getting a lot of tax revenue!
  - some households are complaining about high house prices, but we can put in place some special house lending scheme, eg for young couples



Summing up: during a bubble, all market participants expect house prices to keep on rising, disregarding more or less developments in fundamentals


- → the notion of a bubble is defined in terms of expectations, people's theories about the future path of prices
- → some sort of collective delusion might be at work during a bubble, it affects the judgment of buyers and sellers, lenders and borrowers, builders and developers
- → for a while, the bubble can be a self-fulfilling prophecy: house prices keep on rising, all the buying, building and borrowing looks justifiable and profitable
- → media play an important role in shaping house price expectations





### Summing up (cont'd)

- but house prices are inherently unstable during a bubble: they cannot go up forever; once unsustainable levels in relation to incomes and other "fundamentals" are reached, the acceptance of high prices stops and prices collapse
- → the bubble bursts





### 3. Evidence on the boom-bust cycle

11 CEE countries + Ireland, Spain, Austria, Germany, Switzerland

Period covered: 2000 - 2013:Q2

Peak and trough timings differ across countries

House prices in some countries have yet to reach trough/peak

#### Four groups of countries:

- Super boom (>20% pa from 2000 to peak): Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Bulgaria
- 2. Boom (10–20% pa): Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Spain, Ireland [Romania]
- 3. Strong increase (5–10% pa): Croatia, Hungary, Austria (esp. since 2007:Q4)
- 4. Moderate increase (2-5% pa): Switzerland, Germany

17



#### Changes in house prices (in percent)

	LV	LT	EE	BG	CZ	SK	PL	ES	SI	HR	AT	IE	HU	СН	DE	RO
Cumulative changes																
2000 <sup>1</sup> – peak <sup>2</sup>	605	522	457	349	173	155	139	135	117	100	98	94	89	72	25	
Peak – latest <sup>3, 4</sup>	-30	-42	-26	-39	-20	-18	-19	-29	-19	-29		-53	-22			-36
	LV	EE	LT	BG	PL	SK	SI	CZ	ES	IE	HR	HU	RO	AT	СН	DE
Average annual growth rates																
2000 <sup>1</sup> – peak <sup>2</sup>	33.6	30.2	28.7	21.4	17.2	16.9	15.1	13.8	12.5	11.2	10.0	9.2		5.6 <sup>5</sup>	4.4	1.9
Peak – latest <sup>3</sup>	_4 7	-3.9	_6.0	_6.8	_3.6	_3 /	20	_5.7	5.0	6.0	_5.O	_/ 1	_7.5			


AT = Austria; BG = Bulgaria; HR = Croatia; CZ = Czech Republic; EE = Estonia; DE = Germany; HU = Hungary; IE = Ireland; LV = Latvia; LT = Lithuania; PL = Poland; RO = Romania; SK = Slovakia; SI = Slovenia; ES = Spain; CH = Switzerland.

Source: national data.

<sup>1</sup> End-2000 or earliest available observation (for Slovakia, 2002; Slovenia, 2003; Poland, 2004; Romania 2009). 2 For Austria, Germany and Switzerland, changes in house prices from end-2000 to the latest observation. 3 The latest observation is 2013 Q2; for Bulgaria, Ireland and Switzerland, 2013 Q3. 4 For Latvia and Estonia, house prices dropped by 57 and 53 per cent, respectively, from the peak level to post-crisis trough. Thereafter, house prices rebounded from the post-crisis trough level by 62 and 57 per cent, respectively. 5 For Austria (Vienna), the average annual increase in house prices since 2007 Q4 has been 10.2%.



#### Cumulative changes in house prices from end-2000 to the peak<sup>1</sup>



AT = Austria; BG = Bulgaria; HR = Croatia; CZ = Czech Republic; EE = Estonia; DE = Germany; HU = Hungary; IE = Ireland; LV = Latvia; LT = Lithuania; PL = Poland; SK = Slovakia; SI = Slovenia; ES = Spain; CH = Switzerland.


<sup>1</sup> For Austria, Germany and Switzerland, changes in house prices from end-2000 to the latest observation.

Source: national data.

19



## Cumulative changes in house prices from the peak to the latest observation<sup>1</sup> <sub>Per cent</sub>



BG = Bulgaria; HR = Croatia; CZ = Czech Republic; EE = Estonia; HU = Hungary; IE = Ireland; LV = Latvia; LT = Lithuania; PL = Poland; RO = Romania; SK = Slovakia; SI = Slovenia; ES = Spain.


<sup>1</sup> For Latvia and Estonia, house prices dropped by 57 and 53 per cent, respectively, from the peak level to post-crisis trough. Thereafter, house prices rebounded from the post-crisis trough level by 62 and 57 per cent, respectively.


Source: national data.




The boom is relatively easy to identify ex post, but not in real time


- Many demand-side covariates "usual suspects" such as GDP, wages, interest rates, housing credit – peak either before or after the house prices
- Focusing on the supply side can help if detailed data breakdowns for the construction sector are available
- Difficulty of judging whether a boom is present illustrated currently in Austria, Germany and Switzerland













### 4. Determinants of house prices

Main cross-country econometric studies:

Huynh-Olesen, Steiner, Hildebrandt and Wagner, OeNB, Focus on European Economic Integration, Q2/2013

A Ciarlone, Banca d'Italia, Temi di discussione, no 863, April 2012


Egert and Mihaljek, Comparative Economic Studies, March 2007


2




### Median elasticity estimates for CEE samples

	Ciarlone	OeNB (2013)	Egert-Mihaljek	
Real income/wage	1.06	1.40	1.00	
Real interest rate	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	
Housing loans/GDP	0.31	0.18	0.24	
Unemployment rate	-0.24		-0.19	
Demographic factors		>0, signif.	>0, signif.	
Construction costs	0.35	0.71	>0, sig.	
Building permits	0.27	0.29		
Instit'l/transition factors	>0, signif.	>0, signif.	>0, signif.	









### Special features of housing markets in CEE

Factors which may explain faster growth of house prices in CEE compared to mature market economies

- 1. Poor quality of initial housing stock inherited from socialism
- 2. Low supply of new housing during the 1990s
- 3. Weak housing market institutions
- 4. Transformation of housing finance
- 5. External demand for housing
- 6. Initial undershooting of house prices



#### Other notable results


- · OeNB (2013) find significant effects on house prices of:
  - remittances (as a proxy for external demand)
  - domestic and foreign currency loans to households
  - funding provided by parent banks to CEE subsidiaries
- · Ciarlone (2012) finds that house prices are:
  - highly persistent (median  $\alpha \approx 0.35$ )
  - adjust slowly to long-run eq'm (median  $\beta \approx 0.33$ )
  - sensitive to changes in eq'm house prices ( $\gamma \approx 45$ )

33



### Other notable results (cont'd)

- On the extent of over/undervaluation Ciarlone (2012) finds:
  - for most countries, over/under valuation of house prices is relatively small (± 6%)
  - larger deviations in Latvia (+40%/ −20%), Bulgaria (+10%/ −25%), Lithuania and Poland (±10−12%)
  - deviations of actual from eq'm prices largely accounted for by housing market frictions rather than "bubbles"
  - but overly optimistic expectations seem to have affected house prices in Estonia, Lithuania Slovakia and Slovenia
  - ... and overly pessimistic in Bulgaria and Latvia





### 5. Policy implications

What policy actions could be taken if we are worried a house price boom is about to develop?

### Housing market regulations

Limited housing supply is often a key issue

- Spatial plans and zoning regulations
- Property titles
- Regulations in construction sector
- · Labour market regulations
- ightarrow Origins of house price booms are often microeconomic



### Fiscal policy

- Ideally, tighten fiscal policy in good times
- Strong fiscal position helps in dealing with asset price declines – Estonia, Bulgaria as good examples
- Reduce/eliminate explicit or hidden subsidies for mortgage borrowing and/or home ownership – not sure this is a major issue in CEE

37



### Monetary policy

- Key questions
  - Is monetary policy too easy?
    - → adjust interest rates
  - How far is the house price boom credit-driven?
  - How are banks funding housing loans? (deposits, internally from parent banks, international market)?
    - → use liquidity measures: reserve requirements, liquidity regulation (domestic, FX, marginal)
- Key constraints
  - exchange rate regime
  - free capital movement
  - foreign bank ownership
  - housing market institutions



### Macroprudential policies

- capital measures
- risk weights measures
- provisioning measures
- borrower eligibility criteria
- credit controls

Analysis of the effectiveness of macroprudential policies in CEE: IMF Working Paper no 12/303, December 2012

39



### What could be done about house price expectations?

- media play an important role in shaping house price expectations
- central bank communication about macroeconomic and financial stability aspects of housing market developments can shape expectations, too
- financial education and consumer protection also have a role to play



### **Appendix**

# Additional data on housing markets in CEE and selected European countries

(ordered by the size of house price increase from end-2000 to the peak or the latest observation)

Lithuania Ireland
Estonia Switzerland
Bulgaria Germany

Slovakia Poland Slovenia Hungary Romania

