

Conference on European Economic Integration (CEEI) 2017

A modern take on structural reforms – past and future challenges for CESEE and Europe at large

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THE WINNER TAKES ALL?

DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF

STRUCTURAL REFORMS

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
Motivation

- Structural reforms, championed by the OECD and other IOs, are primarily targeting macroeconomic growth
- But there is an evident discontent about the distribution of the growth dividends, including policy-driven
- Income distribution is no longer at the periphery of policymaking, rather increasingly so at its the core
- We need evidence-based analysis on the nexus between growth, reforms and income distribution: documenting synergies/trade-offs between growth and equity objectives
- The OECD has been an "early bird" on producing inequality analysis for advanced economies and increasingly focuses research efforts on data and policy analysis in this area
- This presentation summarises latest evidence which takes a granular approach to deliver new empirical evidence on growth, reforms and income distribution.




Going granular on the distribution of the growth dividends: key results

Effect on HHDI at different points of the distribution of an increase in productivity



Higher productivity has been associated with growing inequality

Effect on HHDI at different points of the distribution of an increase in employment




The opposite has been observed in the case of employment

Source: Causa, Hermansen and Ruiz (2016).



Going granular on the distribution of *reform-driven* growth dividends: the framework



Going granular on the distribution of reform-driven growth dividends: *interpreting* the results


- Macro "+" Micro=TOTAL effects
- Macro effects:
 - Reform-driven changes in labour productivity and/or labour utilisation which accrue (or not) to household incomes
 - Effect depending on where the household is in the distribution
 - Include distribution-neutral macro effects calibrated from external macro model and distribution-sensitive effects from estimated policy-augmented model

• Micro effects:

- Reform-driven changes in household incomes not channelled through macroeconomic effects
- Effects operating on top of the macro effects (ex: "mechanical" impact of taxes on top of behavioural impact through e.g. increase in LU).
- Some examples of results to follow




Reform 1 example: reducing UB for all unemployed



General mean parameter α


How to read this figure: A reduction in UB average gross replacement rates by 1 percentage point is estimated to increase household disposable income by 0.3-0.8% from the lower-middle class to the most affluent households. This total effect can be decomposed along a micro-level effect and macro-level effect through labour utilization. Non-significant estimates (at the 10% level) are indicated by dots on general mean curves.

Reform 2 example : reducing UB for the long-term unemployed




How to read this figure: A reduction in UB net replacement rates for long-term unemployed (single, 100% of average earnings, no children, 60th month of benefit receipt) by 1 percentage point is estimated to decrease household disposable incomes by 0.2-0.7% on average among the lower-middle class and the poor. This total effect comprises only the micro-level effect since the macro-level effect on labour utilization is insignificant and thus set to zero.

Reform 3 example: increasing family inkind transfers



How to read this figure: An increase in family in-kind benefits (measured in per cent of GDP) by 1 percentage point is estimated to increase household disposable incomes by 5-22% on average from the lower-middle class to the poor and decrease incomes by 6-8% from the upper-middle class to the rich. This total effect can be decomposed along a micro-level effect and macro-level effect through labour utilisation.


Reform 4 example: increasing government spending on education



How to read this figure: An increase in government spending on education (in per cent of GDP) by 1 percentage point is estimated to increase household disposable incomes by 2-8% on average from the poor to the middle class. This total effect can be decomposed along a micro-level effect and macro-level effect through labour productivity.



Reform 5 example: liberalizing network industries



How to read this figure: A reduction in regulation in network industries (ETCR aggregate, index 0-6) by 1% is estimated to increase household disposable incomes by around 0.2% on average across the distribution. This total effect can be decomposed along macro-level effects through labour productivity and labour utilisation. The micro-level effect is insignificant for all income groups and thus not included in the total effect.



Synergies and tradeoffs...depending on the degree of inequality aversion

_abour market and welfare policies	
Reducing UB replacement rates for all unemployed	
Reducing UB replacement rates for the long-term unemployed	
including social assistance)	

Increasing spending on ALMPs
Increasing the legal retirement age

Increasing public spending on families with children (in kind family benefits)

Reducing job protection on regular contracts

Encouraging a decline in in union density

Reducing the legal extension of collective agreements

Encouraging a higher degree of wage bargaining coordination

Reducing minimum relative to median wage

Tax policy

Lowering labour tax wedges (unfinanced)

Education

Increasing public spending on education

Innovation and Technology

Increasing incentives for R&D spending Increasing incentives for patent application

Product market regulation

Reducing barriers to competition

Weak inequality aversion

Tradeoff No tradeoff

Synergy No tradeoff

No tradeoff

No tradeoff
No tradeoff
No tradeoff
No tradeoff

No tradeoff

No tradeoff

No tradeoff

No tradeoff No tradeoff

No tradeoff

Strong inequality aversion

Tradeoff

Tradeoff

No tradeoff Synergy

Synergy

Tradeoff Tradeoff Synergy

Synergy

No tradeoff

Tradeoff

Synergy

No tradeoff
Tradeoff

No tradeoff



Conclusions

- Structural reforms are generally good for the middle class
- Trade-offs appear when the focus is on the poorest section of the population
- Social protection and labour market reforms are the sources of most of the trade-offs between growth and equity objectives
- Reforms of wage-setting institutions may be good or bad for equity, depending on reform design
- Easing barriers to firm entry and competition in product markets produces strong macroeconomic gains without raising trade-offs



Some references

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