## OESTERREICHISCHE NATIONALBANK EUROSYSTEM


# Digging into the composition of government debt in CESEE: a risk evaluation

82<sup>nd</sup> OeNB East Jour Fixe June 11, 2018

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
Opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect the official viewpoint of the the OeNB or the Eurosystem.

## 68<sup>th</sup> OeNB East Jour Fixe: Limited fiscal space in €NB CESEE during the 2008/2009 global financial crisis





## **Crisis mitigation capacity of fiscal policy**

- Recession: Is fiscal policy able to contribute to macroeconomic stabilization?
- Ideally, in order to cushion the downturn, fiscal policymakers would want to rely on:



## Sovereign default risk perceptions: CESEE vs. EA countries






Source: Macrobond. Note: Latest observation: June 1, 2018.

**€NB** 

## Increased post-GFC focus on public debt €NB management and sovereign balance sheet structures

- Das et al. (IMF, 2010): Public debt management (PDM) => financial stability
- Baldacci et al. (IMF, 2011): Sudden changes in financial market conditions => sovereign liquidity (*early warning exercises*)
- Blommestein & Turner (OECD, 2012), Zampolli (BIS, 2012):
   PDM <=> monetary policy
- Kose et al. (World Bank, 2017): cross-country database of fiscal space
- Ostry, J. (IMF, 2018):
  - Given pending monetary policy normalization, paying down increased post-GFC public debt levels is the issue of the day (@ IMF Spring Meetings, 2018)
  - Rating agencies pay now more attention to fiscal space
  - o PDM as underappreciated channel to boost fiscal space

## Deep recessions following the GFC significantly ●NB pushed up government debt ratios in CESEE



Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, as of April 2018.

General government gross debt

## Government debt structure & macro-financial risks

Based on: <u>Eller, M. and J. Holler. 2018.</u> Digging into the composition of government debt in CESEE: a risk evaluation. In: *Focus on European Economic Integration* Q2/18. Vienna: OeNB. 56–80.


## **Creditor structure**

- Long-term investors who are less sensitive to current market conditions reduce liquidity and refinancing risk
  - Typically the case for domestic investors such as pension funds
- However, comparatively shallow capital market make it hard to issue sufficient portions of sovereign debt domestically
- A high share of debt owed to nonresident creditors:
  - Underlines a country's creditworthiness. As long as sufficiently diversified investor base → lower funding costs in normal times
  - But also: first-round economic consequences of a default have to be borne mainly by foreign investors →drives up country risk premia
  - During periods of high global uncertainty: increasing risk to lose access to market funding (liquidity risk) or at favorable conditions (refinancing risk)
  - More difficult access to international capital markets during downturns: *"When it rains, it pours"* (Kaminsky et al., 2004)


## **Government debt by creditor** (countries with debt ratio > 60%)


**ENB** 

General government gross debt by creditor, % of GDP



50 40 30 30 20 10 10 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017





Loans to government from abroad and other government liabilities vis-à-vis nonresidents

Government debt securities held by foreign portfolio investors

Government debt owed to other domestic investors (e.g. NCB, pension funds, investment funds, insurance companies) and statistical discrepancy

Loans to government from domestic banking sector

Government debt securities held by domestic banking sector

-General government consolidated gross debt

Source: Eurostat, IMF, national central banks.

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
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
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
## **Government debt by creditor** (countries with debt ratio < 60%)


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General government gross debt by creditor, % of GDP











BULGARIA



**FYR MACEDONIA** 



Loans to government from abroad and other government liabilities vis-à-vis nonresidents

Government debt securities held by foreign portfolio investors

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Loans to government from domestic banking sector

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----General government consolidated gross debt


Source: Eurostat, IMF, national central banks.

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## Substantial shares of government debt owed to €NB nonresidents, often dominated by portfolio investors

### General government gross debt owed to nonresidents

% of total debt



Source: Eurostat, IMF, national central banks, OeNB.

## €NB

## **Currency structure**

 Issuing FC-denominated debt to attract foreign investors who are not willing to add FC risk to their asset portfolio → reduce funding costs by reducing liquidity premiums and increasing demand


## - A high share of foreign currency debt:

- Implies substantial exchange rate risk: might be especially harmful since it implies not only potential changes in interest payments but also a revaluation of the debt stock
- To which extent exchange rate risks **materialize** depends on a variety of factors: overall exchange rate stability, foreign currency debt being denominated in volatile currencies and/or currencies that are only poorly correlated with the issuer's economic cycle, presence of hedging instruments, ...
- However, foreign investors may also have an important share in domestic currency debt, which under certain circumstances may result in sudden outflows (e.g. HU in the fall of 2008)

## Exchange rate risks in countries with high FC shares and an already large debt stock

### Government debt denominated in foreign currency

% of total debt




Source: Bloomberg, OeNB calculations

**€NB** 

## The EUR dominates public FC borrowing in CESEE EU member states

### **Currency structure of government debt**

% of total debt, end-of-year




Source: Bloomberg, OeNB calculations.

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## The USD dominates public FC borrowing in Russia, Serbia, Turkey and Ukraine

## **Currency structure of government debt**

% of total debt, end-of-year



Source: Bloomberg, OeNB calculations.

**ENB** 

## **Maturity structure**


- Short-term debt issuance is usually associated with lower funding costs
- A high share of debt falling due in the short run (or debt with variable interest rates or short interest rate fixation periods):
  - Implies interest rate risk: An interest rate increase translates into a higher debt servicing burden and thus limits fiscal space
  - Implies also high rollover risk: i.e. the need to refinance a substantial part of debt under uncertain market conditions


## Refinancing risks have been relieved somewhat €NB due to lengthening maturities of debt instruments

#### Average time to maturity - all instruments Outstanding general govt debt maturing within 1 year, all currencies % of total debt weighted average years to maturity of all principal payments in the debt portfolio, cross CESEE-15 average 8 100 90 7 80 6 70 5 60 50 4 40 3 30 2 -8 0 20 1 10 0 ME 31.12.2009 31/12/2014 31/03/2016 30/06/2017 31/03/201 30/06/2012 30/09/2013 ■ 2017q4 O 2012q4 ◆ 2009q4 Source: Bloomberg, OeNB calculations Source: Bloomberg.


- Residual maturities of the sovereign debt profile have broadly lengthened since the GFC
- Nevertheless, a few countries are still subject to a considerable share of debt falling due in 2018


## Several countries face concentrated debt redemptions in the next few years






#### ROMANIA







### FYR MACEDONIA




### MONTENEGRO





#### ALBANIA



## Both LC- and FC-denominated debt experienced <sup>€NB</sup> a gradual decline in short-term maturities ...

Share of debt maturing within 1 year - by currency

#### in % of total Bulgaria Czech Rep. Croatia Hungary Poland Romania ----All currencies ----In local currency ----In foreign currencies

Source: Bloomberg, OeNB calculations.

## ... & FC debt is across the board less of a short-run nature than the one issued in LC

#### Albania FYR Macedonia Serbia Russia Ukraine Turkey ----All currencies ---In local currency ---In foreign currencies

Share of debt maturing within 1 year - by currency

in % of total


Source: Bloomberg, OeNB calculations.

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### Government bonds with interest rates to be refixed within 1 year

% of total government bonds



Source: Bloomberg, OeNB calculations

■ 2017q4 **O** 2012q4 ◆ 2009q4

## **Government debt structure & risk implications (1)**

- Several CESEE countries show vulnerabilities to refinancing risk and market risk
- Strong increase of debt ratios following the GFC & increased shares of government debt owed to foreign portfolio investors → accentuated refinancing risk
- At the same time, residual maturities of the sovereign debt profile have broadly lengthened → alleviated refinancing risk
  - Only a few countries are subject to a considerable share of debt falling due in 2018: AL, HU, MK
  - o ... and/or meaningful short-run repayments in FX: CZ, HU, RU, RS, UA
  - Still, redemption profiles of several countries show pronounced repayment spikes, indicating potential liquidity constraints in the case of future macro-financial stress

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## ONB Government debt structure & risk implications (2)

- As regards **exchange rate risk**, several CESEE countries have been able to keep constant or to reduce the share of FX-denominated public debt since the GFC
- However, a large share of FX-denominated public debt in combination with an already large debt stock – reveals serious exposure to exchange rate risks in a few countries: HR, RS, UA
- Finally, interest rate risks have been relieved somewhat due to lengthening maturities and the resulting reduction in the need to refix interest rates in the short run
- But there are still a few countries with sizable portions of government bonds subject to a short-run realignment of interest rates: AL, CZ, HU, MK, PL, RU

## How to improve the government debt structure?

- Strengthen public borrowing at home and in local currency via fostering the development of capital markets in the region (e.g. EBRD initiative)
- Avoid excessive unhedged positions of foreign currency debt: develop derivative markets to hedge exchange rate risk
- Link coupon payments to certain benchmarks to avoid procyclicality: e.g. inflation- or GDP-linked government bonds (especially in countries with limited fiscal space)