



INTEGRATION AND CONVERGENCE IN THE EMU A COMPLEX DYNAMICS

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
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INSTITUTIONAL INTEGRATION : A LOT OF STEPS HAVE BEEN MADE SINCE (AND BECAUSE OF?) THE CRISIS






INSTITUTIONAL INTEGRATION: A LOT OF ADDITIONAL STEPS ARE IN THE PIPE BUT TWO STRONG RED LINES REMAIN

- The Meseberg roadmap:
 - Public backstop to the Single Resolution Fund (SRF)
 - European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS)
 - Eurozone budget to promote competitiveness, convergence and stabilization
 - Unemployment insurance stabilization fund (without permanent transfers)
 - Further progress on Capital Markets Union...

- Current (and strong) red lines:
 - Debt mutualization
 - Permanent public transfers

EU REAL CONVERGENCE: WHERE DO WE STAND NOW?





20 YEARS AHEAD : FURTHER REAL DIVERGENCE ?

(GDP PER CAPITA, CONSTANT PRICES – 2010 REFERENCE LEVELS)



Option 1: 1999-2008 Trend (from 2018)

Option 2: 2008-2018 Trend (from 2018)





RISE OF OLD-AGE DEPENDENCY RATIO EVERYWHERE, BUT INCREASING DIVERGENCES (65 AND OVER, % OF TOTAL POPULATION)




Source: Ageing report (2018)

REAL DIVERGENCE, HOW MUCH IT MATTERS?


- If there is perfect intra EA labour mobility, real divergence becomes **only a problem of territory planning**
- In this case, limited additional needs of intra EA transfers
 - Transfers for public investment in infrastructures (but no need of change of scale of European Structural and Cohesion Funds)
 - Some mutualisation of public education costs at least during the transition period
 - But legacy problems (public debt)
- And need of structural reforms to facilitate labour mobility
 - Cross-border pensions right portability is key

WEAK INTEGRATION OF LABOUR MARKETS

Index of under-employment (unemployed, discouraged, unvoluntary partial Time, % of labour force)




Labour cost index in manufacturing (2001Q1=100)



Source Eurostat, BDF calculations (unemployed, discouraged, unvoluntary partial Time, % of labour force)


WEAK INTEGRATION OF LABOUR MARKETS

Youth unemployment rate (% active population)



Source: Ameco


EU-28/EFTA foreign-born population of working age by origin



Source: Eurostat


EDUCATION : HETEROGENEITY OF LEVEL AND SPENDINGS

PISA science



Source: OECD

Education spending (% of GDP)





Source: Ageing report (2018)



EDUCATION : HETEROGENEITY OF ADULT SKILLS - PIAAC DATA (2016)

Percentage of adults scoring at each proficiency level in literacy and numeracy




REAL DIVERGENCE, HOW MUCH IT MATTERS?

- **If we assume desired imperfect intra EA labour mobility, real divergence is inevitable and could be worsened by labour mobility** (« The lessons of Massachusetts for EMU » (P. Krugman, 1993) : « *A more integrated market leads to divergence in both the Economic structure and the growth rate of regions.* »)
- **Hence, there is a need for risk sharing**
 - to address idiosyncratic shocks and smooth cyclical divergence
 - but also to mitigate structural divergences
- **Private risk sharing through global financial integration can help, but would it be enough?**
- « The lessons of Massachusetts for EMU » (P. Krugman) : « *In the US the heavily federalized fiscal system offers a partial solution to the problem of regional stabilization. Unless there is a massive change in European institutions, this automatic cushion will be absent.* » remain partly true




BUMPY NOMINAL CONVERGENCE AND PAINFUL ADJUSTMENTS




BUMPY NOMINAL CONVERGENCE AND PAINFUL ADJUSTMENTS

Panel a – Current account balance (2007, in % of GDP, y-axis) and unemployment rate (2013, in % of labour force, x-axis)




Source: Eurostat and authors' calculations

Panel b – Unit labour cost (cumulated growth 2002-2007 in %, y-axis) and unemployment rate (2013, in % of labour force, x-axis)



Source: Eurostat and authors' calculations

BUMPY PATH OF FINANCIAL INTEGRATION IN THE EURO AREA



Sources: ECB and ECB calculations.


» REAL DIVERGENCE, HOW MUCH IT MATTERS?

- **The trade off between risk sharing and risk reduction** : the unpleasant arithmetic due to :
 - divergent public debt level and path
 - GDP growth divergence
 - resilient banks/sovereign nexus and doom loop
 - worsening effect of potential increased labour mobility

Banking Union, Capital Markets Union are decisive (but unachieved) steps forward but we could need more?


EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC DEBT IN THE EURO AREA

(GROSS PUBLIC DEBT, % OF GDP)






EMU IN A GLOBALISED WORLD : A DECREASING COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE OF A CUSTOMARY UNION






EMU IN A GLOBALISED WORLD : A DECREASING COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE OF FINANCIAL INTEGRATION

Equity home bias (based on stock market capitalisation data)



Debt home bias



SOURCE : INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS HOME BIAS IN EUROPE'S CAPITAL MARKET UNION, DARVAS, SCHOENMAKER, WP BRUEGHEL, 2017

- Achieve the Single Market, including for financial services
- Strengthen the institutional integration
- More labour market integration,
- Upward education level harmonisation