

Introduction

- CESEE countries have been characterized by considerable out-migration in past decades
- Together with unfavorable demographic developments this adds up to a large decline of the working age population (Atoyan et al., 2016; IMF, 2016; IMF, 2017)
- In this study we intend to
 - describe the socio-demographic profiles of the prospective emigrants from CESEE,
 - learn about their motives to leave, and
 - highlight in particular the role played by the contentment with public services.
- We use data from the OeNB Euro Survey collected in fall 2018
 - Descriptive analysis
 - OLS and IV estimations with inputs from (Polychoric) Principal Component Analysis

Literature

- Previous research (Raggl, 2019) shows that migration intentions in CESEE are
 - more common among young individuals and men
 - less prevalent among individuals that are part of large families
 - closely related to individual unemployment and regional development
 - significantly higher among individuals with direct and indirect networks
- What role does the contentment with public services play in shaping migration intentions?
 - Which public services play key roles social security, education, etc.?
 - Are there heterogeneities?
- Dustmann and Okatenko (2014) and Manchin and Orazbayev (2018) work on the link between migration intentions and local amenities; the topic is also covered in the EBRD Transition report (2018)





Data – The OeNB Euro Survey


Individual-level survey commissioned by OeNB

https://www.oenb.at/en/Monetary-Policy/Surveys/OeNB-Euro-Survey.html

• 6 EU countries: BG, HR, CZ, HU, PL, RO

4 non-EU countries: AL, BA, MK, RS

- Since 2007 (semi)annually
- 1,000 randomly selected individuals/country/wave
- unique information about (euro) cash holdings, saving behavior and debt; respondents' economic opinions, expectations and experiences



Data – The OeNB Euro Survey

Fall-wave 2018:


- "Do you intend to move abroad within the next 12 months?"
 - "yes", "no", "don't know", "no answer"
- + information on socio-demographics, economic situation, region of residence,...
- + special module on public spending: satisfaction with public services
 - Social security, public infrastructure, education, health, public safety, econ. development
- + data on night light (VIIR), urban fabric (CORINE) and road density (GRIP)

Limitations:

- No distinction between temporary and permanent migration
- Intentions vs. actual behavior

Migration intentions in CESEE

Migration intentions by age and gender




Source: OeNB Euro Survey (2018).

 9.0% of individuals aged 25 to 64 intend to move abroad within the next year

Migration intentions...

- ... decline with age
 - 23.4% among 25-29 year-olds
 - 13.0% among 30-34 year-olds
 - < 10% among those aged 40+
- ... are higher among men
- ... do not differ greatly with education

Population pyramid for CESEE



The population pyramid shows the


- gender,
- age,
- education, and the
- migration intentions


of individuals.

Hypothetical population pyramid:

If all migration intentions were realized, immediately and contemporaneously, the pyramid would be more constrictive, and there would be less men, *ceteris paribus*.

Contentment with public services in CESEE





- Level of dissatisfaction considerable in CESEE, variation across countries
- Dissatisfaction higher among those with migration intentions (differences stat. sig. except for social security)

Empirical specification

$$m_{i} = \alpha_{r} + \beta^{D} D_{i} + \sum_{j=1}^{J} X_{j}^{S} \beta_{j}^{S} + \sum_{k=1}^{K} X_{k}^{E} \beta_{k}^{E} + \sum_{l=1}^{L} X_{l}^{R} \beta_{l}^{R} + \sum_{m=1}^{M} X_{m}^{N} \beta_{m}^{N} + \sum_{p=1}^{P} X_{p}^{T} \beta_{p}^{T} + \epsilon_{i}$$

- m_i is a binary variable indicating migration intentions,
- D_i is a variable capturing an individual's **dissatisfaction with public services**,
- X_i^S is a vector of J socio-demographic variables,
- X_k^E is a vector of K economic factors,
- X_l^R is a vector of L variables related to **regional economic development**,
- X_m^N is a vector of M **network** variables,
- X_p^T is a vector of P factors approximating **trust in institutions**, and
- a_r is a country- or PSU-specific constant and ϵ_i the remaining error term



Results: OLS estimation (1)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Socio-dem	Economic	Wealth	Regional	Networks	Trust	PSU-FE
PPCA: Dissatisfaction w/ pub. ser.	0.00768**	0.00970***	0.00997***	0.00947***	0.00722***	0.00722***	0.00729***
	(2.14)	(2.83)	(2.84)	(2.92)	(3.09)	(2.98)	(3.26)
Female	-0.0298***	-0.0304***	-0.0304***	-0.0294***	-0.0296***	-0.0262***	-0.0248***
	(-4.71)	(-4.69)	(-4.60)	(-4.50)	(-4.42)	(-4.11)	(-3.80)
Age	-0.00445***	-0.00418***	-0.00411***	-0.00407***	-0.00396***	-0.00390***	-0.00348***
	(-10.12)	(-8.93)	(-8.84)	(-9.03)	(-9.52)	(-9.57)	(-8.92)
Medium education	-0.00439	0.00212	0.00231	0.00607	0.0196**	0.0220**	0.0308**
	(-0.48)	(0.24)	(0.26)	(0.67)	(2.00)	(2.18)	(2.41)
High education	-0.0211	-0.0119	-0.0109	-0.00723	0.0156	0.0171	0.0203
C	(-1.35)	(-0.81)	(-0.78)	(-0.55)	(1.38)	(1.50)	(1.42)
PPCA: Large family	-0.0207***	-0.0244***	-0.0236***	-0.0238***	-0.0223***	-0.0226***	-0.0162***
Ç	(-7.42)	(-7.66)	(-6.88)	(-6.84)	(-6.77)	(-6.31)	(-3.98)
Log(size of town)	0.00131	0.00400^{*}	0.00384*	0.00461*	0.00190	0.00184	
,	(0.65)	(1.91)	(1.83)	(1.78)	(0.77)	(0.74)	
	•••	•••	•••	•••		•••	

Results: OLS estimation (2)

 Log(equiv. income)		-0.0251 (-0.62)	-0.0246 (-0.60)	-0.0174 (-0.42)	 -0.0291 (-0.78)	-0.0357 (-0.97)	-0.0483 (-1.20)
Log(equiv. income) sq.		0.000692 (0.31)	0.000668 (0.30)	0.000715 (0.32)	0.00104 (0.51)	0.00130 (0.65)	0.00230 (0.96)
Unemployed		0.114*** (5.83)	0.111*** (5.79)	0.0995*** (5.00)	0.103*** (5.55)	0.0991*** (5.24)	0.0893*** (4.80)
PPCA: Wealth			-0.000967 (-0.15)	-0.00205 (-0.34)	-0.0128** (-2.19)	-0.00984* (-1.73)	-0.0101* (-1.82)
PPCA: Direct networks					0.0524*** (7.03)	0.0512*** (6.58)	0.0489*** (5.79)
PCA: Indirect networks					0.0222*** (3.97)	0.0224*** (3.90)	
PCA: Trust in local inst.						0.000610 (0.24)	
PCA: Trust in EU						0.00883*** (3.01)	0.00409 (1.10)
R^2	0.0897	0.107	0.105	0.108	0.150	0.152	0.0795
N	9418	7114	7046	7017	6957	6557	6585

Results: IV estimation


	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	OLS	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
PPCA: Dissatisfaction w/ public	0.00755***	0.126**	0.0854**	0.0153***	0.0168***	0.0166***
services						
	(3.79)	(2.47)	(2.00)	(2.85)	(3.13)	(3.09)
Observations	6604	6593	6593	6604	6593	6593
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic		4.260	3.205	27.14	23.96	22.36
Hanson-J		1.661	7.326	24.73	31.93	36.27
Hanson-J p		0.646	0.198	0.364	0.235	0.166
Instrumental variables:						
PCA Road density (4 components)		Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
PCA Urban fabric (2 components)		No	Yes	No	No	Yes
State spending inadequate		No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes

t statistics in parentheses. All specifications include the full set of covariates that are used in the most exhaustive OLS specification as well as country fixed effects. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01



Results: OLS estimation – distinguishing by type of public service

Impact of dissatisfaction with public services - OLS estimations



Source: Estimations based on OeNB Euro Survey (2018).

Note: All specifications include the full set of covariates that are used in the most exhaustive OLS specification as well as country fixed effects. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.

Conclusions

- 9% of the working-age population in CESEE intends to move abroad within the next year
- Actual emigration would not only change the size but also the demographic decomposition of the population in CESEE
- Factors closely related to individual migration intentions are
 - age and gender
 - family characteristics
 - unemployment
 - networks
- But also the dissatisfaction with public services plays a role in shaping migration intentions

Conclusions

Policy relevance:

- Effects of demographic and family characteristics as well as of networks leave little room for policy interventions
- Employment opportunities: currently tight labor markets might reduce migration intentions
- **Public services:** improved quality of public services can reduce emigration pressures and might incentivize re- and immigration
- Yet, emigration did and will challenge social security systems and public finances in the region:
 - Risk of a vicious circle: Dissatisfaction with public services → emigration → increased pressure on public finances → decrease in quality of public services → dissatisfaction → emigration...
 - But also opportunity to turn this into a virtuous circle by adopting appropriate policies

Danke für Ihre Aufmerksamkeit Thank you for your attention

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