

Credit Booms and Capital Flows: Role of Financial Systems and Policies

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
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The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly


- Credit booms
 - As signs of financial deepening
 - Financial intermediation relaxes constraints and helps growth
 - As systemic risk indicators
 - Lending standards deteriorate, which may destabilize the system
- Capital flows
 - Allocation efficiency, diffusion of know-how
 - Sudden stops

Figure 3. Credit Booms and Financial Deepening, 1970-2010



Sources: IMF *International Financial Statistics*; staff calculations.

Figure 5. Credit Booms and Financial Crises: Examples of Bad Booms



Sources: Laeven and Valencia (2010), IMF *International Financial Statistics*; staff calculations.

Shaping our research agenda

- Lack of a robust early warning model that tells the good and the bad apart
- Explore different pieces of the puzzle separately to identify regularities
 - 1 out of 3 credit booms preceded by financial account liberalization, only 2 percent associated with reversals (Dell'Ariccia et al, 2016)
 - Capital inflow surges another regularity as net inflows increase from 2.3 to 3.1 percent of GDP in the three-year period before a boom

This presentation

- Capital flows and credit growth
- Capital flows and economic growth
- A word on policies

General research approach

- Evidence at the aggregate level using more granular data than most literature
 - Capital inflows: FDI, portfolio, other
 - Credit: Households, firms
- Further supported with firm-level and sector-level data
 - Variation in external finance dependence across sectors
- Differentiating between financial system characteristics
 - Depth, bank- versus market-based

Data and methodology

- Range of sources from IMF and BIS to WorldScope
- 20+ countries, more than a decade
 - 1980–2011 for aggregate data, 1991–2011 for firm-level data, 1998–2010 for sectoral data
- Standard fixed-effect panel regressions

$$Y_{it} = \alpha CI_{it-1} + \beta X_{it-1} + v_i + n_t + \varepsilon_{it}$$

- Extend to firm-level and sectoral analysis

$$Y_{ijkt} = \gamma RZ_{jt} \times CI_{kt} + \alpha_1 RZ_{jt} + \alpha_2 CI_{kt} + \beta_1 F_{ijkt-1} + \beta_2 M_{kt} + v_i + n_t + \varepsilon_{ijkt}$$

Credit growth and booms are significantly related to portfolio and other flows

	Credit growth		Boom	
HOUSEHOLDS				
CI	0.337**		0.010**	
FDI		0.102		0.007
Portfolio		0.329*		0.011**
Other		0.380***		0.010**
FIRMS				
CI	0.252**		0.007**	
FDI		0.082		0.007*
Portfolio		0.161		0.008**
Other		0.341***		0.006**

Depth and type of flow is important for households while less market-based systems transform any flow into firm credit

	Financial Development		Financial Structure	
Households	High	Low	High	Low
FDI	0.060	0.128	-0.212	-0.174
Portfolio	0.180**	0.687	0.390	0.042
Other	0.190**	0.857*	0.269	0.229
Firms	High	Low	High	Low
FDI	0.057	-0.070	-0.091	0.332**
Portfolio	0.089	0.388*	0.110	0.315**
Other	0.235**	0.438**	0.368***	0.381***

Channels

- Demand
 - Boost asset prices
 - Enhance firm value
 - Improve balance sheets
 - Decrease external finance premium
- Supply
 - Domestic bank health determines existing credit constraints
 - Less healthy banks → failure to meet demand

Demand side has relevance for other flows:
 firms with increasing equity and collateral
 values are able to raise more loans

DV: Total debt growth	Demand Side	
	Net equity growth	Collateral value growth
Indicator×FDI	-0.004	0.825
Indicator×Portfolio	-0.128	0.337
Indicator×Other	0.297**	1.726*

Supply side also has some relevance: when domestic banks are constrained, capital inflows are more closely associated with credit growth

	Capitalization		Distance to default		NPLs	
	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low
FDI	-0.185	0.301***	-0.033	0.127	0.265	-0.046
Portfolio	0.170	0.222**	-0.014	0.270**	0.583**	0.036
Other	0.351**	0.258**	0.153	0.347***	0.641***	0.231*

Debt inflows associated with faster output growth while equity inflows associated with reduced output volatility

	Equity inflows		Debt inflows	
Output growth	FDI	Portfolio	Banks	Nonbanks
Capital flows	0.002	0.009	0.004	0.007*
CF*RZ	0.004	-0.001	0.022***	0.014*
Output volatility	FDI	Portfolio	Banks	Nonbanks
Capital flows	0.002	-0.005	0.004*	-0.003
CF*RZ	-0.007**	-0.004	-0.006	-0.003

Capital inflows' association with output growth stronger with more foreign presence and in well-functioning banking systems

	Foreign Bank Share		Profitability		NPLs	
	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low
FDI	0.005	0.001	0.010	-0.028*	-0.002	0.008
Portfolio	0.016	-0.020	0.016	-0.006	-0.050*	0.009
Other	0.015**	0.010	0.017**	0.011	0.013	0.012**

What to do?

Encourage deepening of financial markets to harness benefits:
Institutional quality, Macroeconomic stability

But be cognizant of risks from rapid growth:
Use a mix of policies to deal with financial booms & busts

Macroprudential policy first line of defense, especially if concern
is a single sector/segment:
Target leverage and strengthen balance sheets

Monetary policy definitely to be involved when there are other signs
of overheating

Fiscal and structural policies to limit distortions with a long-term view

Evidence on effectiveness of macroprudential policies (so far)

- Promising
 - Reduction in procyclicality of credit
 - Negative link to booms and to booms turning bad
 - Capital inflow-credit relation no longer significant
- More success in building up buffers than preventing a boom
- Analysis of household surveys point to an impact on expectations
- Emerging Europe case indicates effectiveness of some (CAR and non-standard liquidity) measures
- Latin America case shows moderate, transitory effect

Summary

- **Capital inflows:**
 - boost credit growth and increase the likelihood of credit booms for both households and firms
 - increase output growth in financially constrained firms
- **Composition matters:**
 - Debt flows appear to be the main driver for credit and output growth
 - Equity flows associated with reduction in volatility
- **System matters:**
 - Association with faster household credit growth in more developed systems and with faster corporate credit in less market-based systems
 - Output growth benefits in well-functioning systems
- **Promising evidence on macroprudential policies**

Resources from the IMF

- **Main references for this presentation**
 - [Igan, Kutan, and Mirzaei, forthcoming, “Real effects of capital inflows in emerging markets”](#)
 - [Dell’Ariccia et al. 2016 “Credit booms and macrofinancial stability”](#)
 - [Igan and Tan 2015 “Capital inflows, credit growth, and financial systems”](#)
 - [Cerutti et al. 2015 “Housing finance and real estate booms: A cross-country perspective”](#)
 - [Crowe et al. 2013 “How to deal with real estate booms: Lessons from cross-country experiences”](#)
- [Global Housing Watch](#) (see the latest developments in and research on housing markets around the world)
- **Other related publications (not an exhaustive list)**
 - [LTV and DTI Limits—Going Granular \(WP, 2015\)](#)
 - [An Overview of Macroprudential Policy Tools \(WP, 2014\)](#)
 - [Macroprudential Policies to Mitigate Financial System Vulnerabilities \(WP, 2014\)](#)
 - [Leaning Against the Wind: Macroprudential Policy in Asia \(WP, 2014\)](#)
 - [Evaluating the Net Benefits of Macroprudential Policy: A Cookbook \(WP, 2013\)](#)
 - [Macroprudential Policy: A Practical Approach to Systemic Risk Monitoring \(WP, 2013\)](#)
 - [Key Aspects of Macroprudential Policy \(PP, 2013\)](#)
 - [The Interaction of Monetary and Macroprudential Policies \(PP, 2013\)](#)
 - [Global Housing Cycles \(WP, 2012\)](#)
 - [Toward Operationalizing Macroprudential Policies: When to Act? \(GFSR, 2012\)](#)
 - [Externalities and Macroprudential Policy \(PP, 2012\)](#)
 - [Macroprudential Policy: An Organizing Framework \(PP, 2011\)](#)
 - [Do Loan-To-Value and Debt-To-Income Limits Work? Evidence From Korea \(WP, 2011\)](#)