“If you want a thing done well, do it yourself” - Empirical Evidence for Principal-Agent Problems in Austrian SMEs
Summary
Delegating management can come at a cost. Using data on 47,178 Austrian SMEs, this paper finds that separating ownership and management can lower operational efficiency and profitability. The analysis uses the distance between owners and firms as an instrument to study this relationship. The efficiency finding is particularly robust. Results are consistent with conflicts of interest between owners and managers and highlight the potential value of incentives, reporting and monitoring when owners delegate control.
Highlights
How costly is the principal agent problem?
The separation of ownership and management can create conflicts of interest when managers do not fully share owners‘ objectives. This principal-agent problem is central to corporate governance, yet its impact on firm performance is difficult to isolate empirically.
Ownership-management separation matters
The preferred estimates indicate that ownership-management separation lowers firm efficiency and profitability substantially. The estimates relate to firms whose organizational structure responds to owner-firm distance. The results are remarkable remarkably stable when robustness checks are performed.
IFLD: One Database to Answer Them All (Nearly)
The study uses the new IFLD database for 2021. The IFLD links information from the Austrian commercial register on shareholders, their ownership stakes and managing directors with firm balance sheets and owner and firm locations. This combination enables the analysis of ownership–management separation and firm performance.