OeNB Bulletin Q4/25
OeNB
- published:
- January 2026
OeNB
OeNB Bulletin Q4/25 (PDF, 11.4 MB) January 2026
Mapping geopolitical fragmentation: a bilateral index for economic analysis (PDF, 8.9 MB) Kirsamer, Kirsamer. We propose a bilateral and time-variant compound indicator measuring shifts in political relations for 193 countries that covers the period from 2002 to 2022. It draws on freely available and regularly updated sources: ideal point distances of UN General Assembly votes, the Voice and Accountability Index of the World Bank and the level of representation index. We combine these indices into a politically-driven variable for geopolitical fragmentation, which can be used in economic analysis. Furthermore, we use a machine-learning method for network clustering to determine geopolitical blocs of countries that are consistent with recent observations of political shifts and events. For our last observation in 2022, the data-driven method produces three blocs: a US bloc, a Chinese bloc and a third bloc that includes mainly South American and Southern African countries. In a global environment characterized by new prioritizations and strategic shifts, our index or the information about geopolitical bloc building can serve as a valuable tool for analyzing the impact of fragmentation on trade, capital flows and migration. en geopolitical fragmentation, bloc building, deglobalization, machine learning F55, F63, F68, F51 Nov 14, 2025, 12:00:00 AM
Crypto assets in Austria: robust evidence from HFCS wave 5 on ownership, motives and portfolio implications (PDF, 842 kB) Fessler, Weber. Using the 2023 Austrian Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS), which featured a dedicated crypto asset module, we provide the first probabilistic, nationally representative estimates of Austrian households’ crypto asset ownership in a balance sheet context. Weighted results show that 3.9% of Austrian households (i.e. about 161,000) hold crypto assets. Crypto asset ownership is concentrated among younger (8% under 30), male (5.4% vs. 2.9% female), highly educated (7.6% vs. 0.3% less well educated), self-employed (13.3%) and urban holders. Most households entered the crypto asset market during 2019–2021, with a peak in 2020, and 75% acquired crypto assets via crypto exchanges. Bitcoin is held by about 80% and ether by roughly 40% of crypto-owning households. Median holdings are EUR 3,000, rising to EUR 20,000 at the 95th percentile; in most cases, crypto assets account for less than 20% of households’ financial assets. The most frequently cited motivations are investment and/or speculation (40%), curiosity (24%) and trend participation (16%). Hardly any crypto asset holders intend or expect to use crypto assets to make payments. Portfolio analysis shows that crypto assets complement traditional risky assets, raising risky asset participation from 16.6% to 39.0% among holders and constituting the main risky exposure for many lower-wealth households. We also relate our results to other sources, including data on customers of crypto intermediaries and on taxable revenue, which offer complementary perspectives without allowing for direct empirical alignment. en crypto assets, household portfolios, financial innovation, wealth surveys, measurement bias, HFCS, CAMEG, survey methodology, Austria D14, G11, G18, E21, C81 Dec 4, 2025, 12:00:00 AM
EU–Mercosur deal: a subtle tradeoff in growth, emissions and global cooperation (PDF, 1.4 MB) Abeliansky, Breitenfellner, Džubur. Negotiations on the trade agreement between the EU and Mercosur were concluded in 2024, though ratification is still pending. Some EU countries remain opposed to the agreement, primarily due to agricultural and environmental concerns. Using Oxford Economics’ Global Economic Model (GEM), we simulate the impact of a general trade shock resembling the agreement's estimated outcome. Our results show the impact on trade, GDP, inflation, employment and greenhouse gas emissions in the EU-27, Austria and the three largest Mercosur countries after the agreement’s implementation in the post-adjustment phase in 2040. The EU and Mercosur would both see rising trade, though Mercosur's increase would be ten times larger in relative terms. Similarly, after 15 years, annual GDP gains are expected to be modest in the EU (0.02%) and slightly stronger in Mercosur (0.06%). The environmental impact is projected to be relatively more pronounced: greenhouse gas emissions in 2040 could increase by 0.1% in the EU and by 0.8% in Mercosur. While these findings are within the range of (but somewhat lower than) those of prior studies, they should be interpreted with caution, given the model’s limitations. Despite environmental concerns, the agreement could signal a commitment to global cooperation and ensure the EU’s access to essential raw materials for the green transition. In return, Mercosur countries would receive financial support for their green and digital transformations, strengthening sustainability standards and efforts against deforestation. en EU–Mercosur agreement, trade liberalization, environmental impact, economic assessment F17, F18, F62 Dec 15, 2025, 12:00:00 AM
The price of division: sticky prices and monetary policy in a fragmenting world (Q4/25) (PDF, 654 kB) Lechthaler, Mileva. We develop a dynamic three-region model combining features of modern trade models and macroeconomic models to study the role of nominal rigidities and monetary policy after trade fragmentation shocks. We find that trade fragmentation substantially reduces GDP and persistently raises inflation. Nominal rigidities play an important role in shaping the adjustment process. Monetary policy faces a trade-off between stabilizing inflation and output, but reacting to the surge in inflation with a lag (”looking through”) can reduce the economic downturn at relatively low cost in terms of inflation. en Trade policy, monetary policy, price rigidity, dynamic trade model F11, F12, F13 Jan 8, 2026, 12:00:00 AM