Publikationen

Russia’s financial landscape has changed rapidly in recent years, with the lines between banks and tech firms ever more blurring and giving rise to large fintech firms. We are going to look at these changes from a perspective before and after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Pre-war, tech firms such as Yandex or VK and financial firms such as Sberbank started diversifying into each other’s business by broadening service offers to consumers via so-called digital ecosystems. From an international perspective, two things stand out: first, with Sberbank, Russia’s largest bank is attempting to fully rebrand itself as a technology company. Second, the Russian government facilitates these developments both directly and indirectly, e.g. by pushing the country’s digital transformation while simultaneously exercising more control over foreign tech firms. From a post-invasion perspective, international sanctions pose several challenges to large fintech firms; and so do economic and geopolitical developments. Going forward, the firms will face major issues in advancing their digital ecosystems. As to technology-related sanctions, we show that Russia continues to substantially depend on technologies from abroad, despite pre-war efforts to reduce this dependence. Russia’s economy in general and its tech and fintech firms in particular are thus vulnerable to international technology sanctions. As to sanctions evasion, particularly through crypto assets, we currently see limited potential for circumvention. Clearly, sanctioning countries need to perceive sanctions as a dynamic tool that they must adjust regularly to address potential loopholes and circumvention tactics.

Key findings from the 49th OeNB Economics Conference and the 35th SUERF Colloquium (May 23/24, 2022)

After several years of persistently below-target inflation rates, global inflation has been increasing sharply since 2021. Several driving factors have been identified: (i) the vigorous post-pandemic economic recovery; (ii) disruptions in global value chains for intermediate and final goods, due in part to short-term pandemic-related factors and in part to a possible reversal of globalization; (iii) cycles in commodity and energy production and prices, some of which may also be related to actual or anticipated climate protection measures; and (iv) labor market shortages resulting from pandemic-induced structural changes in labor demand and supply. Whether the rising inflation rates are temporary or more permanent has been subject of lively debates. Among other things, the answer hinges on the reaction of expectations and wages to the rise in headline inflation. Central banks worldwide have come under pressure to tighten their policy rates. The risk of missing a timely response and of inflation becoming entrenched, as a result, contrasts with concerns of strangling the post-pandemic economic recovery amid the fallout from the war in Ukraine and Western sanctions against Russia. At a political economy level, the interplay between monetary policy, fiscal policies and financial stability has become more complicated, with high debt, high asset market valuations and climate challenges potentially hampering central banks’ perceived anti-inflationary resolve.

Tackling the climate crisis is one of the biggest challenges of our times with major repercussions for the macroeconomy. This study focuses on the impact of setting a price for carbon on consumer price inflation. Carbon pricing is a cost-effective means to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and incentivize sustainable behavior by increasing the prices of fossil fuels. To assess the related inflationary risk, we elaborate on two complementary (explicit) pricing approaches – carbon taxation and emissions trading – in the EU and in Austria. After teething problems, the emissions trading system launched by the EU in 2005 turned into an effective tool of decarbonization, with roughly 30% of EU-wide emissions cut by 2020 as emission allowance prices were raised over time. In Austria, rising allowance prices did not have a significant impact on inflation given the high share of renewable sources in power generation. With regard to the carbon tax that Austria will apply in the course of 2022 to sectors not covered by emissions trading, we estimate HICP inflation to go up by 0.1 to 0.2 percentage points annually until 2025, excluding indirect and second-round effects. Looking forward, trends in climate change and low-carbon transition may further impact inflation, its volatility and its distributional consequence and pose a challenge for monetary and other policies alike. This, however, should not detract from necessary climate protection in view of the consequences of unmitigated climate change on inflation and human activity at large.

Erhöhter Bedarf an kurzfristiger Finanzierung bei österreichischen Unternehmen in Folge des Ukraine-Kriegs

Der Bedarf der österreichischen Unternehmen an kurzfristiger Finanzierung von Lagerhaltung und Betriebsmitteln hat sich im zweiten Quartal 2022 intensiviert und die Kreditnachfrage deutlich steigen lassen. Die wirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen des Kriegs in der Ukraine und die damit zusammenhängenden Lieferkettenprobleme und Preisanstiege sind der wesentliche Grund dafür.

Die Lieferkettenprobleme veranlassen Unternehmen, vorsorglich ihre Lagerbestände aufzubauen, um selbst produktions- und lieferfähig zu bleiben – ein Strategiewechsel von „just-in-time“ zu „just-in-case“. Umfassende Preissteigerungen erhöhen generell den Liquiditätsbedarf der Unternehmen.

Die Unsicherheit über die weitere wirtschaftliche Entwicklung wirkt hingegen dämpfend auf die Nachfrage nach langfristigen Krediten, weil Unternehmen bei Investitionen vorsichtiger sind bzw. Investitionsprojekte verschieben.

Angebotsseitig veranlassen der Krieg und seine Folgen die Banken zu verschärften, an die Situation angepassten Risikoanalysen und zu strengeren Kreditvergabeentscheidungen. Ihre Kreditangebotspolitik im Unternehmenskundengeschäft haben die Banken teilweise bereits restriktiver ausgestaltet, weitere Verschärfungen sind absehbar.

What role does the quality of public services play in shaping migration intentions? Using OeNB Euro Survey data collected in 2018, we study the impact of individual perceptions of public services quality on individuals’ migration intentions in ten Central, Eastern and Southeastern European (CESEE) countries. We apply ordinary least squares (OLS) as well as instrumental variable (IV) estimations, using externally merged infrastructure-related variables and individuals’ opinions on the adequacy of public spending on services as instrumental variables. Our findings suggest that dissatisfaction with the quality of public services in the home countries increases the likelihood of individuals having migration intentions. Broken down by the type of public service, we find that dissatisfaction with social security, health, public infrastructure and with services that target businesses and regional development is associated with higher migration aspirations. Furthermore, for people with young children, we see a higher effect on migration intentions resulting from dissatisfaction with education, health and public safety. For self-employed individuals, the effect of dissatisfaction with public services that address companies and regional development is particularly important. The results further confirm that sociodemographic characteristics, economic factors and network effects are closely associated with the aspiration to move abroad.